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Fixing Music Copyright 
Jamie Lund† 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2012, musician Beck Hansen (Beck) released 
Song Reader, a concept “album” consisting of 20 unrecorded songs 
in sheet-music form. As one reviewer put it: “There is no CD. No 
download. No audio. As of this writing, you cannot hear Beck 
doing an authoritative, this-is-the-song performance.”1 According 
to the album’s publisher, “if you want to hear Do We? We Do, or 
Don’t Act Like Your Heart Isn’t Hard, bringing them to life 
depends on you, the reader.”2 
Beck’s sheet music album was inspired by a 1937 
popular music hit called “Sweet Leilani.”3 “‘Apparently, it was 
so popular that, by some estimates, the sheet music sold 54 
million copies[.]’”4 Beck remarked that “nearly half the country 
had bought the sheet music for a single song, and had 
presumably gone through the trouble of learning to play it.”5 Beck 
was hoping to similarly engage his fans with Song Reader,6 and, 
as evidenced by the hundreds of fan performances posted on 
                                                          
 † Many thanks to St. Mary’s University School of Law for funding this 
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Special thanks to Phu Nguyen, Justin Righettini, Lucinda Bartlett, Brad Greenberg, 
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 1 John Timpane, Play It Yourself, PHILLY.COM (Dec. 26, 2012, 12:33 PM), 
http://articles.philly.com/2012-12-26/news/36000154_1_sheet-music-song-reader-ukulele. 
 2 Sean Michaels, Beck’s New Album Won’t Be an Album—Just Sheet Music, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2012, 6:50 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2012/aug/09/beck-
new-album-sheet-music. 
 3 Geeta Dayal, Lost Cause, SLATE (Dec. 6, 2012, 12:33 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/music_box/2012/12/beck_s_song_reader_
reviewed.html. 
 4 Id.  
 5 Id. 
 6 Esther Yi, Is Beck’s Sheet-Music ‘Album’ a Cop-Out, Radical Art, or Both?, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 11 2012, 8:45 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/
2012/12/is-becks-sheet-music-album-a-cop-out-radical-art-or-both/266125 
(“‘In an ideal world, I’d find a way to let people truly interact with the records I put 
out,’ Beck said in a 2006 interview with Wired, ‘not just remix the songs, but maybe 
play them like a videogame.’”). 
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YouTube and other websites, it worked.7 Other fans, however, 
have criticized the concept as being pretentious8 and exclusionary 
because not everyone can read music or play a musical 
instrument.9 “There is an obvious hurdle of musical literacy.”10 
This led one fan to wonder, “Does Beck only want musicians 
and musically trained fans to enjoy his music?”11 
The anomaly of Beck’s sheet music album demonstrates 
the often-elided distinction between a musical composition and 
the sound recording of its performance; each is separately 
copyrightable. This article contends that the audience for those 
two kinds of works—compositions and sound recordings—is 
different. This insight has significant implications for the test for 
copyright infringement of musical compositions. 
Copyright infringement occurs when one work is 
substantially similar to the work it copies.12 In music, substantial 
similarity is determined by playing recordings of the two works to 
jurors in the Lay Listener Test.13 The Lay Listener Test is meant 
to capture whether the defendant appropriated in his work 
enough of what in another’s work is “pleasing to the ears of lay 
listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular 
                                                          
 7 See, e.g., Automatic Toys, Beck—Do We? We Do!, YOUTUBE (Sept. 8, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zc0fnEY89Co. 
 8 See, e.g., Downtownrobbrown, Blog Comment, Most Pretentious Move in 
Music History?, SOULSTRUT (Nov. 13, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.soulstrut.com/
index.php/forums/viewthread/74912/; Benjamin Salt, Beck Hansen’s Song Reader; 
Pretentious Elitism Or Creative Masterstroke?, GIVE THE ANARCHIST A CIGARETTE (Dec. 
18, 2012), http://givetheanarchistacgarette.blogspot.com/2012/12/becks-song-reader-
pretentious-elitism.html. 
 9 notnicolajames, “Beck’s new release is sheet music only—not a recorded 
CD”, NOTNICOLAJAMES, (Aug. 11, 2012), http://notnicolajames.wordpress.com/2012/08/
11/becks-new-release-is-sheet-music-only-not-a-recorded-cd/. 
 10 Yi, supra note 6. 
 11 notnicolajames, Comment to Beck’s New Album Won’t Be an Album—Just 
Sheet Music, GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2012, 12:39 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/music/
2012/aug/09/beck-new-album-sheet-music#comment-17622195. Others wondered if the 
beauty of the sheet music alone was worth the purchase price. James Montgomery, 
Beck Stages Return With New Non-Album, “Song Reader”, MTV.COM (Aug. 8, 2012, 
3:16 PM), http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1691428/beck-hansens-song-reader-sheet-
music-album.jhtml (“Oh, and in case you can’t actually play a musical instrument, 
well, you can still admire the pretty pictures that come along with the “Song 
Reader,” . . . . There’s also an introduction by Slate’s Jody Rosen and a foreword by 
Beck himself. So it’s not just sheet music.”). 
 12 Assuming the copied work is copyrighted and that the copying is of 
copyrightable elements in the original work. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 
468 (2d Cir. 1946); MCCARTHY, J. THOMAS ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 576-77 (3d ed. 2004). 
 13 4 CHARLES MCMANIS ET AL., WEST’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE 
§ 4009 (3d ed. 1999) (“The ‘ordinary lay observer’ test, used by a number of circuits, was 
focused by the Fourth Circuit upon an intended audience for the copyright owner’s work and 
whether that audience has specialized expertise relevant to their purchasing decision.”). 
2013] FIXING MUSIC COPYRIGHT 63 
 
music is composed.”14 As currently utilized by courts, the Lay 
Listener Test applies to both musical compositions and the 
sound recordings of their performances. This general application 
of the Lay Listener Test fails to acknowledge a fundamental 
reality—that the audience for musical compositions is different 
from the audience for musical recordings. The audience for 
musical recordings is anyone who listens to musical sound 
recordings, be it on iPods, on the radio, in shopping centers, or via 
the soundtracks of movies or television shows. In contrast, the 
audience for musical compositions is not the average listener of 
music. If we take copyright’s most common definition of a musical 
composition as “an artist’s music in written form,”15 then the 
intended audience for musical compositions, like those in 
Beck’s Song Reader, would appear to be other musicians who 
are capable of performing and/or recording musical 
performances for listeners.16 This theoretical insight demands 
that courts change the way they administer the Lay Listener 
Test when adjudicating suits of alleged copyright infringement 
of musical compositions. 
In this context, the Lay Listener Test prejudices 
outcomes because it incorrectly targets lay jurors rather than 
musical performers. For the purposes of this article, an 
experiment was conducted in which a mock Lay Listener Test 
was given to two groups: musicians17 and laypeople.18 Both 
groups listened to two pairs of songs.19 Each pair of songs 
consisted of the same musical composition performed in different 
manners; thus, although the composition for each recording was 
exactly the same, the sound recordings were different. The 
musicians and laypeople were asked to determine the 
similarities between the songs in each pair on an ordinal scale 
(“1 = Not at all similar,” to “5 = Very similar”). When comparing 
the compositions, the respondents should have answered “5,” 
                                                          
 14 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69, 473. 
 15 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff ’d, 
349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), amended on denial of reh’g, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), 
aff ’d, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A musical composition captures an artist’s music 
in written form.”). 
 16 Readers of written music may enjoy a musical composition as a purely 
notational or quasi-linguistic work. 
 17 The group of musicians included approximately 40 musical performers (two 
sections of students in a music theory class). 
 18 There were approximately 100 music listeners—law students selected from 
Golden Gate University’s 1L class—who, like a typical jury population, consisted 
primarily of non-musicians but contained a small percentage of musicians with varying 
degrees of education and training. 
 19 Sound clips are available at www.jlundlaw.com/p/experiment.html. 
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because the compositions were identical.20 In fact, musicians 
got much closer to the right answer (4.42) than laypeople 
(3.60).21 The musicians’ responses to open-ended questions 
indicated that they better understood the precise nature and 
quality of the similarities and differences between the songs 
than the laypeople respondents. Furthermore, it appears that 
laypeople cannot be trained in a reasonable time frame to listen 
with a more discerning ear. In a different iteration of the 
experiment, laypeople received a 15-minute ear-training exercise 
yet failed to show any discernible improvement in completing 
the exercise. Another group of laypeople underwent a semester-
long music appreciation class and demonstrated only a slight 
improvement in completing the exercise. These experimental 
findings suggest that musicians listen to, and experience, 
music in distinctively different ways than laypeople, ways that 
would alter the outcomes of the Lay Listener Test. 
This finding is extremely problematic because, as a 
practical matter, by determining whether a work has been 
infringed, the Lay Listener Test effectively defines the scope of a 
copyright. And if musicians and laypeople assess similarity 
differently, the scope of the copyright will depend on who is asked 
rather than what the law actually says: a copyright protects 
others from copying what is “pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, 
who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is 
composed.”22 
If musical compositions are only accessible to musicians, 
then musicians should comprise the group that courts probe to 
determine if there has been a copyright violation. Consequently, 
this article advocates that courts alter the Lay Listener Test to 
include proper statistical sampling that captures reactions from 
a composition’s intended audience—musical performers. This 
suggestion is not as drastic as it sounds. Courts commonly use 
consumer surveys (completed by the intended users of a 
trademarked brand) in trademark infringement actions,23 and 
rules ensuring the validity and reliability of trademark surveys 
                                                          
 20 The sound clips were electronically generated to have identical melody, 
harmony, and rhythm. Participants were asked to compare only the similarities 
between these elements and to exclude any consideration of genre, style, tempo, and 
instrumentation. 
 21 These results were for Song 3 and 4. 
 22 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (emphasis added). 
 23 See Shashank Upadhye, Trademark Surveys: Identifying the Relevant 
Universe of Confused Consumers, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 549, 
555-56 (1998) (“In short, strong consumer survey results can counter a defendant’s 
argument that the plaintiff failed to prove actual confusion.”). 
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can arguably apply equally well in the music copyright context.24 
Under this proposal, survey evidence gathered from musical 
performers would not serve as conclusive proof of substantial 
similarity. The jury, as fact finder, would still bear the ultimate 
responsibility for making a determination of substantial 
similarity under the court’s watchful eye. Under this framework, 
the fact finder would weigh the credibility of the evidence of 
substantial similarity for the intended audience rather than 
stand in as the intended audience and make a potentially 
misguided judgment of substantial similarity. In collecting 
better evidence about how the intended audience actually 
experiences the work, the substantial similarity analysis would 
shift from an approach that relies upon judicial guesswork to 
one that employs more reliable statistical sampling. 
Part I of this article explores the origins and reasons for 
copyright’s distinction between musical compositions and musical 
recordings. This section discusses the Lay Listener Test’s focus on 
intended audience and argues that the audience for a musical 
composition is musical performers, not laypeople. Part II details 
the experiment and the results underlying this article and 
demonstrates that musicians understand music differently than 
laypeople in ways that would alter the outcome of the Lay 
Listener Test. Part III concludes that the Lay Listener Test 
should include surveys of the intended audience (musical 
performers), similar to the way that trademark infringement 
cases make use of consumer surveys that target the intended 
audience of the allegedly infringed trademark.   
I. MUSICAL PERFORMERS AS THE INTENDED AUDIENCE 
In the Lay Listener Test for music copyright 
infringement, jurors are played songs and asked to determine 
whether the defendant took enough of what is “pleasing to the 
ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such 
popular music is composed,” to constitute a misappropriation.25 
For musical recordings, the intended audience is clear—it is the 
general public who either buys the recording directly or 
                                                          
 24 See J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music 
Copyright Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 442 (2004) (“Similarly, 
in cases of music copyright infringement, the ‘reactions’ of listeners is at the heart of 
the inquiry as to whether there is an infringement. Because surveys ‘create an 
experimental environment from which to make informed inferences,’ they could be used 
by the trier of fact in music copyright infringement actions to make the ultimate 
determination of illicit copying.”); infra Part III.B. 
 25 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
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consumes it indirectly, such as through the soundtrack of a film 
or television show. In contrast, a musical composition, defined 
by copyright law as being roughly what is contained in the sheet 
music, is not audible in its purest form, but rather is only a 
component part of any given performance or recording of the 
composition.26 Musical performers constitute the only 
constituency that can properly consume musical compositions. As 
such, the Lay Listener Test should rely on fluent musicians as the 
intended audience when employed to assess whether an 
infringement of a musical compositions has occurred. 
A. The Distinction Between Musical Composition 
Copyrights and Sound Recording Copyrights 
Under U.S. copyright law, each musical recording can 
include at least two27 separate and distinct copyrights: (1) a 
copyright for the underlying musical composition, and (2) a 
copyright for the sound recording of a musical composition.28 
These two copyrights are doctrinally separate: one protects what 
the other does not. Traditionally, the composition copyright 
covered what appeared in a typical piece of sheet music (though 
sheet music itself was not equivalent to the composition)29: 
melody,30 harmony,31 rhythm,32 and lyrics, if any.33 Congress 
introduced copyright protection for sound recordings in the 
                                                          
 26 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff ’d, 
349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), amended on denial of reh’g, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), 
aff ’d, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A musical composition’s copyright protects the 
generic sound that would necessarily result from any performance of the piece.”). 
 27 It is possible that there could be a third copyright—a derivative work 
copyright in the arrangement of the composition. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a 
derivative work as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”). 
 28 See T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1576 n.1 (D.N.J. 
1987) (“When a copyrighted song is recorded on a phonorecord, there are two separate 
copyrights: one on the musical composition and the other in the sound recording.”). 
 29 A musical composition is not necessarily just the sheet music or anything 
that could be contained in sheet music. Rather, a musical composition consists of “the 
generic sound that would necessarily result from any performance of the piece.” 
Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. 
 30 Melody is “[a] single line of notes heard in succession as a coherent unit.” 
MARK EVAN BONDS, LISTEN TO THIS 517 (2d ed. 2011). 
 31 Harmony is “[t]he sound created by multiple voices [or pitches] playing or 
singing together.” Id. at 516. 
 32 Rhythm is “[t]he ordering of music through time.” Id. at 518. 
 33 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.05[D], at 
2-58 (2013) (“It has been said that a musical work consists of rhythm, harmony and 
melody—and that the requisite creativity must inhere in one of these three.”). 
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1970s.34 The copyright for sound recordings protects sounds 
fixed in a phonorecord,35 and includes performance choices such 
as tempo,36 instrumentation/timbre,37 key,38 and genre/style. 
Others are free to make a different sounding recording, but they 
are not free to copy or sample that exact recording.39 As a 
practical reality, there are musicians who just compose and 
musicians who just perform.40 In making its distinction between 
                                                          
 34 Sound Recordings Act, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012)). 
 35 Sound recordings are defined as “works that result from the fixation of a 
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Circular 56, 
U.S. Copyright Office, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf (“Generally, copyright 
protection extends to two elements in a sound recording: (1) the contribution of the 
performer(s) whose performance is captured and (2) the contribution of the person or 
persons responsible for capturing and processing the sounds to make the final 
recording.”); Copyright “Help”, found at http://www.copyright.gov/eco/help-author.html 
(“A sound recording consists of the contributions of the performer(s) and/or the 
producer(s)/sound engineer(s). The performance and production form an integrated whole, 
i.e. a sound recording, and are subject to a single registration. A sound recording is separate 
and distinct from the underlying work being recorded. For example, a song (words and 
music) is a separate work from the recording of that song. . . . Performance refers to sound 
recording authorship fixed by a human performer. The performance of a musical work 
consists of the particular vocal and/or instrumental recorded rendition of that work.”). 
 36 Tempo is the speed or rate at which a song is played. See BONDS, supra 
note 30 at 518 (defining tempo rubato). 
 37 Timbre is the quality of a sound that makes two instruments or voices 
sound different from each other. See id. at 353, 518. For instance, one can distinguish 
between a human voice and a trumpet because of the timbre, or unique sound quality 
of each. See id. at 360. Timbre can vary within a particular instrument or sound class 
(for instance, a distorted electric guitar sound versus a classical acoustic guitar sound) or 
even in the same performance (for instance, when a blues saxophone player “growls” into 
the instrument or plays with more audible “breathiness”). See id. at 118-19. Perhaps as a 
result, the Ninth Circuit in Newton v. Diamond concluded that timbre choices were a 
performance aspect of a sound recording, and not a compositional aspect: 
For example, Dr. Dobrian declared that ‘Mr. Newton blows and sings in such 
a way as to emphasize the upper partials of the flute’s complex harmonic 
tone, [although] such a modification of tone color is not explicitly requested in 
the score.’ Dr. Dobrian also concludes that Newton ‘uses breath control to 
modify the timbre of the sustained flute note rather extremely’ and ‘uses 
portamento to glide expressively from one pitch to another in the vocal part.’ 
Dr. Dobrian concedes that these elements do not appear in the score, and 
that they are part of Newton’s performance of the piece. 
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 38 Key is where in the musical scale a song is pitched. See BONDS, supra note 
30, at 517. 
 39 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or 
duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation 
of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted 
sound recording.”). 
 40 See Gabriel Jacob Fleet, Note, What’s in A Song? Copyright’s Unfair 
Treatment of Record Producers and Side Musicians, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1278-79 
(2008); see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, YouTube, UGC, and Digital Music: Competing 
Business and Cultural Models in the Internet Age, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 431, 456 (2010). 
68 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
the composition and sound recording copyright, Congress 
decided to protect each separately.41 
Musical compositions first received copyright protection 
at a time when sheet music sales dominated.42 In the absence of 
audio reproduction technologies, written sheet music was 
essentially the only means of fixing a musical composition in a 
“tangible medium,” as is required under the Constitution43 and 
the Copyright Act.44 Not only that, the purchase of sheet music 
                                                          
 41 See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. XVI, 4 Stat. 436 (1831). Although music was 
not protected by the first U.S. Copyright Act in 1790, when copyright protection for 
music was added in the Copyright Act in 1831 it gave a song’s composer “the sole right 
and liberty of reprinting, publishing and vending such . . . [work] . . . in whole or in 
part . . . .” Id. This was the start of the composition copyright. The scope of the 
composition copyright was later expanded in 1897 specifically to include the exclusive 
right to perform the work publicly. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 Stat. 
694. In addition, composition copyright holders currently have the right to exclude 
others from making copies or phonorecords, to prepare derivative works, and to 
distribute copies, among other rights. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public 
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly 
by means of a digital audio transmission. 
Id. 
 42 EDWARD B. SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 31-32, 131, 
136 (2000). Music consumers would purchase sheet music of popular songs in books, 
magazines, or individually. Id. The sheet music could then be performed on a home 
piano or other instrument. Id. 
 43 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing federal copyright protection to 
apply to “writings”). 
 44 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression . . . .”); id § 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when 
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”). For a discussion of the 
technological shift from reproducing compositions in sheet music form to piano rolls for 
player pianos, see Kurt E. Kruckeberg, Note, Copyright “Band-Aids” and the Future of 
Reform, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1545, 1548 (2011). 
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was the primary means of consuming music at the time.45 Take, 
for instance, Beck’s inspiration for his Song Reader album—the 
Bing Crosby 1937 hit “Sweet Leilani.”46 Although Bing Crosby 
had a popular recorded version, the song’s sales came largely 
through the purchase of its sheet music.47 
Though sound recordings became increasingly popular 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the composition copyright remained 
the only music copyright.48 But in the early 1970s, Congress 
passed The Sound Recording Act of 1971 (SRA)49. The SRA 
protected the interests of the music industry by attempting to 
curtail the rampant unauthorized copying of sound recordings.50 
Musical industry experts testified that legitimate sound 
recording owners in 1970 lost at least $100 million in revenue 
due to this unauthorized copying.51 The SRA was later 
incorporated into the current Copyright Act of 1976,52 which 
defined sound recordings as “works that result from the 
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.”53 
There are both market and legal consequences to the 
Copyright Act’s distinction between musical compositions and 
musical recordings. Generally, a composer owns a work’s 
musical composition copyright whereas a performer—or, more 
typically, a record label—owns the sound recording copyright.54 
The composition copyright is generally thought to include only 
the work’s “rhythm, harmony and melody.”55 Although some 
                                                          
 45 Keyes, supra note 24, at 410 (“Thus, the music that was consumed by the 
public of those days was primarily printed sheet music.”). 
 46 Dayal, supra note 3. 
 47 The song sold 54 million copies, according to Beck, or nearly half the 
country’s population. Id. 
 48 See Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and H.R. 6927 
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 25 (1971). 
 49 Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 114 (2012)). 
 50 Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair Pay, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 726, 735 n.38 (1992) (citing Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on 
S. 646 and H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 25 (1971)). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (current 
version at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). This act gave copyright protection to sound 
recordings that were made after February 15, 1972. See id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Arewa, supra note 40, at 456 (“Recorded music typically involves two 
separate copyrights, one in the musical work, generally retained by the composer or 
songwriter, and one in the sound recording, generally held by recording companies.”). 
 55 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, § 2.05[D], 2-58 (“It has been said that a 
musical work consists of rhythm, harmony and melody—and that the requisite 
creativity must inhere in one of these three.”); accord Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N 
The Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 475 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Newton v. 
Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff ’d, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 
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commentators have argued for the adoption of a more expansive 
definition of composition copyright that looks beyond these 
elements, no court has yet expanded the protection of a 
composition copyright.56 
If a music performer made a sound recording of a 
composition that included additional expressive elements that 
were both original to that sound recording and that satisfied 
the Copyright Act’s “modicum of creativity”57 requirement, she 
would own a copyright over all of that new and original 
creative expression.58 Original expression in a sound recording 
of a musical composition could include performance choices like 
tempo and the overall “sound” of the performance.59 Unlike 
musical composition copyrights, however, the recording copyright 
only protects exact replications of earlier recordings (i.e., 
sampling).60 Others are free to make “sound-alikes.”61 For 
instance, although they captured the “sound,” “feel,” and even 
the instrumentation of a Marvin Gaye recording in their hit 
“Blurred Lines,” performance artists Pharrell Williams and 
Robin Thicke did not commit copyright infringement of Gaye’s 
recording because they did not copy the melody, harmony, or 
rhythm of Gaye’s original recording.62 
The distinction between the copyrights is important for 
one more aspect of copyright infringement litigation: 
determining the proper audience for a musical composition for 
purposes of the Lay Listener Test. 
                                                                                                                                  
2003), amended and reh’g denied by 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), aff ’d, 388 F.3d 1189 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
 56 Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music 
Composition Copyright Infringement, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 144 (2011) 
(arguing that no court has “relied on music performance factors such as tempo, 
orchestration, key/pitch, or style/genre to sustain a finding of Substantial Similarity in 
a Composition Copyright case.”). 
 57 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, n.51 (1991). 
 58 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193-94. 
 59 Id. at 1194. 
 60 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in 
a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making 
or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent 
fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the 
copyrighted sound recording.”); see also Newton, 388 F.3d at 1194 (finding that the 
composition copyright was not infringed where the defendant had sampled a sound 
recording consisting primarily of “highly developed performance techniques, rather 
than the result of a generic rendition of the composition.”). 
 61 17 U.S.C. § 114(b). 
 62 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, 
Inc., No. 13 Civ. 06004 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/160768726/Blurred-Lines-Complaint. 
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B. Looking to the Intended Audience 
Copyright infringement requires a showing of 
substantial similarity, which, in a musical composition 
copyright case, is typically assessed by performing the two 
songs to the jury in what is called the Lay Listener Test.63 
Misappropriation of a copyrighted musical composition 
is a question of fact to be determined by a jury.64 A prima facie 
case of copyright infringement consists of proving: (1) that the 
allegedly infringed work is copyrighted, (2) that the defendant 
copied from the copyrighted work, and (3) that the defendant 
copied enough of the protected expression so as to make the two 
pieces substantially similar.65 To find substantial similarity, the 
jury must conclude that the defendant misappropriated either a 
quantitatively large portion of the plaintiff’s original copyrightable 
expression, or a smaller, but qualitatively significant, portion of the 
plaintiff ’s protected original expression.66 
Although a standard for substantial similarity has 
never been clearly defined, there are several cases that suggest 
that looking to the opinions of the intended audience is not only 
relevant, it is the core consideration. 
First and foremost, Arnstein v. Porter, the source of the 
Lay Listener Test, suggests that the test is meant to determine 
the effect on the intended audience: 
The plaintiff ’s legally protected interest is not, as such, his 
reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential financial 
returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public’s 
                                                          
 63 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). But see ROBERT C. 
OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW, § 3:1.1 
(2003), available at http://www.pli.edu/product_files/booksamples/631_sample3.pdf. 
 64 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (stating that similarity is “an issue of fact which 
a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine. . . . [E]ven if there were to be a trial before a 
judge, it would be desirable (although not necessary) for him to summon an advisory 
jury on this question.” (footnote omitted)). 
 65 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“To 
establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid 
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”); 
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 732 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he law has 
established a burden shifting mechanism whereby plaintiffs can establish a prima 
facie case of infringement by showing possession of a valid copyright, the defendant’s 
access to the plaintiff ’ s work, and substantial similarity between the plaintiff ’ s and 
defendant’s works.”); Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1923) (“To 
constitute an infringement of the appellant’s composition, it would be necessary to find 
a substantial copying of a substantial and material part of it.”). 
 66 See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 907 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished 
disposition) (affirming trial court’s special verdict form where, after excluding the 
possibility of quantitative similarity, the form asked: “Is the expression of the musical 
idea and the music from ‘E.T.’ substantially similar as defined in the instructions to a 
qualitatively important music expression in ‘Joy’?”(internal quotations omitted)). 
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approbation of his efforts. The question, therefore, is whether 
defendant took from plaintiff ’s works so much of what is pleasing to 
the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such 
popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated 
something which belongs to the plaintiff.67 
Courts typically only consider questions of appropriate 
intended audience when the general public does not constitute 
the audience for a work.68 The inquiry of intended audience 
particularly arises when the subject matter demand specialized 
expertise in order to be understood, as in cases pertaining to 
computer code, and, as this article argues, musical 
compositions.69 
Some, relying on language from Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co., have argued that courts should not 
be concerned with a work’s intended audience. In that case, the 
Supreme Court was presented with whether a phonebook was 
copyrightable.70 The Court noted that all that is necessary to 
show infringement is ownership of a valid copyright and the 
“copying of constituent elements of the [copyrighted] work that 
are original.”71 This two-pronged requirement suggests that the 
jury might play a sort of “Where’s Waldo” to find copied original 
expression in the defendant’s work; infringement would arise 
whenever the jury finds identical elements between the two 
works. 
The Supreme Court has never endorsed nor rejected the 
Lay Observer Test. (The Lay Listener Test is the Lay Observer 
                                                          
 67 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (footnotes omitted). This quote might be 
interpreted in such a way that the phrase “who comprise the audience” modifies the 
phrase “lay listeners,” indicating that the intended audience for everything would be 
the lay listener. Professors Jeanne Fromer and Mark Lemley make the argument that 
the court is using the jury as a substitute for typical consumers of the works based on: 
(1) the court’s exclusion of both tone-deaf people from appropriate audience members 
and (2) the suggestion that a judge should not attempt to make a decision himself but 
should assemble an advisory jury to experience the work. See Jeanne Fromer & Mark 
Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2272235 (“This reasoning seems to suggest that typical consumers of the work 
ought to be the audience (even though the Second Circuit cases applying Arnstein 
consistently specify a different audience construct, the ordinary observer).”). 
 68 Fromer & Lemley, supra note 67, at 29-30 (describing the Second Circuit’s 
use of intended audience for software copyrights, the Ninth Circuit’s use of intended 
audience for computer games, and the Fourth Circuit’s use of intended audience for 
church choir music). 
 69 See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (computer software infringement case where the court admitted evidence 
regarding whether a specialized audience of computer programmers would consider the 
works to be substantially similar). 
 70 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 71 Id. at 361. 
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Test; it is “listener” because the comparison is aural). In fact, 
commentators have criticized the test as improperly departing 
from Feist’s two-prong test of “copying of constituent elements 
of the [copyrighted] work that are original.”72 
There is an inherent appeal to the Feist approach for 
determining copyright infringement, particularly its ability to 
be administered in a straightforward fashion by courts and its 
ease of application by jurors. But what if there is no exact 
replication of original expression, only attempts to evoke or 
even paraphrase the expression? Professor Nimmer has argued 
that “[t]he mere fact that the defendant has paraphrased rather 
than literally copied will not preclude a finding of substantial 
similarity . . . . [C]opyright ‘cannot be limited literally to the 
text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.’”73 
When determining similarity, courts frequently state that two 
works may be either quantitatively or qualitatively similar.74 
Qualitative similarity addresses the relative significance of the 
copied portion.75 In Newton v. Diamond, a Ninth Circuit 
musical composition copyright infringement case, the dissent 
opined that “[e]ven passages with relatively few notes may be 
qualitatively significant. The opening melody of Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony is relatively simple and features only four notes, but it 
certainly is compositionally distinctive and recognizable.”76 
Insofar as a creative work is “distinctive” and 
“recognizable,” it can only be so to a particular ear, eye, or 
other sensory perception. In his 1967 seminal essay “The Death 
of the Author,” Roland Barthes discusses the essential role of 
the audience in understanding a creative work.77 Barthes 
theorized that the audience—with its various cultural, historical 
and social contexts—infuses a creative work with constantly 
renewed meanings.78 He writes, “The text is a fabric of 
quotations resulting from a thousand sources of culture.”79 For 
                                                          
 72 Id. 
 73 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1] 
(2013) (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)). 
 74 See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“Substantiality is measured by considering the qualitative and quantitative 
significance of the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff ’ s work as a whole.”). 
 75 Id. at 1196 (noting that plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence of 
the “segment’s significance in relation to the composition as a whole” to show 
qualitative similarity). 
 76 Id. at 1197. 
 77 ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in THE RUSTLE OF LANGUAGE 
49, 53 (Richard Howard trans., 1986). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
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Barthes, the significance of a creative work lies not in the 
author but in the audience that enjoys or consumes it. 
Barthes’ postmodernist insight has a practical reality in 
the context of the Lay Listener Test. In asking juries to 
determine substantial similarity, courts recognize that 
judgments about the uniqueness, meaning, and cultural or social 
significance of a work must be obtained from its audience. 
However, this act of substituting the jury’s judgment for that of 
a work’s intended audience can be problematic when the jury 
does not properly represent the constituencies that make up the 
particular work’s intended audience. Although the members of 
a lay jury may comprise part of the intended audience for a 
popular work, this is not always the case. 
C. Musical Performers as the Intended Audience 
Who constitutes the audience for whom such popular 
musical compositions are composed? The Second Circuit in 
Arnstein v. Porter assumed that, for popular music, it was the 
average juror selected from the general population.80 The 
plaintiff in that case, Ira Arnstein was a Tin Pan Alley 
composer who, despite sales of nearly two million for one of his 
songs, was largely known then—and is only known now—for the 
series of lawsuits he brought against more successful 
composers.81 Among other theatrics, Arnstein was known for 
strolling around the streets of New York City wearing a 
sandwich board that read, “My songs have been plagiarized by 
the following writers: Irving Berlin, George Gershwin, Cole 
Porter, Jerome Kern, Rodgers and Hart.”82 The defendant in the 
case was Cole Porter, the most prolific and influential of the 
Tin Pan Alley composers.83 
To determine whether there was sufficient “substantial 
similarity” between Arnstein’s and Porter’s respective 
compositions to constitute unlawful or illicit copying, the court 
employed what it called the “ordinary lay hearer” test (i.e., the 
Lay Listener Test).84 Arnstein would play the songs in open 
                                                          
 80 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 81 B. MacPaul Stanfield, Note, Finding the Fact of Familiarity: Assessing 
Judicial Similarity Tests in Copyright Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 489, 
489-90 & n.1 (2001); see also Jack Lawrence, The Story Behind the Song: Play Fiddle 
Play, JACK LAWRENCE SONGWRITER, http://www.jacklawrencesongwriter.com/songs/
play_fiddle_play.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). 
 82 Lawrence, supra note 81. 
 83 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 84 Id. at 468 (“[T]he test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer.”). 
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court, and he was known for playing them in a manner that 
emphasized similarities:85 
Arnstein’s lawyer had a piano and fiddle player in court plus huge 
music charts, an intriguing presentation. The melody line of a song 
consists of single notes in the clef treble. Arnstein’s chart highlighted 
notes in both the clef and bass and when the fiddler played only the 
high-lighted notes . . . lo and behold!—it sounded exactly like our 
song! Our attorneys spent hours trying to explain this to the judge, 
but he would only accept what he was hearing.86 
A musicologist might have helped the judge understand 
what he was hearing, but unfortunately the Second Circuit in 
Arnstein held that the use of such expert testimony to 
determine substantial similarity was “irrelevant” and should 
not be permitted.87 The court reasoned that the proper inquiry 
was “whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of 
what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the 
audience for whom such popular music is composed . . . .”88 It 
rejected the use of “the refined ears of musical experts” as 
being irrelevant because “the views of such persons are caviar 
to the general [public]—and plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
compositions are not caviar.”89 Because the general public was 
the intended audience for popular music, the opinions of lay 
jurors, and not that of music experts, was what mattered in a 
musical composition copyright case.90 
Arnstein v. Porter was decided in 1946, just nine years 
after “Sweet Leilani” became a hit. The decision arose during the 
peak of an “era when sheet music was king,” a “simpler, seemingly 
halcyon time, [when] friends would gather around a piano in the 
                                                          
 85 See, e.g., Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 277 (2d 
Cir. 1936). 
 86 Lawrence, supra note 81 (emphasis added). Arnstein continued his practice 
of performing the compositions in a way that created the impression of greater 
compositional similarity throughout his many lawsuits. Song Writer Plays Piano for 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1939, at 18. 
 87 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469 (“If copying is established, then only does there 
arise the second issue, that of illicit copying (unlawful appropriation). On that issue (as 
noted more in detail below) the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer; 
accordingly, on that issue, ‘dissection’ and expert testimony are irrelevant.”). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. (“The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts or their 
views as to the musical excellence of plaintiff ’ s or defendant’s works are utterly 
immaterial on the issue of misappropriation.”). 
 90 Because experts are not the “intended audience,” the court reasoned that 
the views of experts were wholly inapplicable to a substantial similarity analysis. Id. 
(“The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts or their views as to the 
musical excellence of plaintiff ’ s or defendant’s works are utterly immaterial on the 
issue of misappropriation; for the views of such persons are caviar to the general—and 
plaintiff ’ s and defendant’s compositions are not caviar.”). 
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parlor and play popular songs together.”91 The average music 
consumer was still buying and playing sheet music, and sheet 
music sales for hit songs generated millions of dollars in revenue.92 
Today, whether a song is a “hit” is determined not by sales of sheet 
music, but by record sales. Although the intended audience for 
popular musical recordings may still be the general public, this 
article contends that the intended audience for musical 
compositions is now limited to musicians. 
Whereas the general public at the time of Arnstein may 
have been able to consume musical compositions in their sheet 
music form, the reaction to Beck’s Song Reader suggests that the 
general public has lost this ability. A significant portion of the 
population cannot sing, perform, or read written music, at least not 
to the level of fluency. Today, musical fluency resides primarily 
within a population of musical performers. Therefore, the audience 
for musical compositions is no longer the general public, but 
musicians with specialized knowledge and experience who can 
convert the composition into a form for mass consumption. 
The modern market for musical compositions exists 
almost exclusively in copyright licensing.93 Today’s “music 
publishers” do not sell sheet music to the public but instead 
manage the copyrights to the musical compositions they 
control.94 The only direct participants in today’s market for 
composition copyrights are the songwriters that create the 
compositions; the publishers and performance-rights societies 
                                                          
 91 Dayal, supra note 3. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See What is Music Publishing?, MUSIC PUBLISHER’S ASS’N FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.mpaonline.org.uk/FAQ (last visited Aug. 27, 2013). 
 94 Id.; see also NAT’L MUSIC PUBLISHERS’ ASSOC. (“NMPA”), MUSIC 
PUBLISHING 101 (2009), available at http://www.nmpa.org/pdf/legalissues/Music101-
NMPA-May2009pdf.pdf. 
A music publisher works with songwriters to market and promote their 
songs, resulting in exposure of songs to the public and generating income. 
Music publishers “pitch” songs to record labels, movie and television 
producers and others who use music, then license the right to use the song 
and collect fees for the usage. Those fees are then split with the songwriter. 
Id. at 4. The shift in intended audience can be attributed to technological innovations 
that allowed consumers to listen to sound recordings rather than perform the music 
themselves: 
By the 1950s, the music industry was a multi-dimensional being that had at 
its disposal many techniques and abilities to reach the consuming public with 
music. The industry had far outpaced its humble beginnings of simply 
offering copies of sheet music for sale. Indeed, music publishing was no longer 
the preeminent method of choice for the music industry to peddle its wares to 
the masses. 
Keyes, supra note 24, at 417. 
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that manage them;95 and the performers, recording studios, and 
sound engineers that obtain licenses to record or perform the 
copyrighted compositions.96 The general public is not the 
intended audience of copyrighted musical compositions in the 
same way that the average automobile driver is not the 
intended market for crude oil. Arguably, only performers, 
music publishers, sound engineers, etc., can properly consume 
musical compositions. These groups, and not the general 
public, represent the target market for, and intended audience 
of, copyrighted musical compositions. 
The optimal adjudicatory scenario for musical 
composition copyright infringement cases, therefore, would be 
to amass a jury of musicians fluent enough in music theory or 
performance to be able to understand or consume sheet music. 
Because this is rarely feasible, courts should allow the 
introduction of expert testimony that articulates to juries the 
elements of particular compositions that are substantially 
similar to one another.97 Better yet, courts should allow parties 
to introduce listener test results from statistically reliable 
samples of actual musicians. 
Of course, none of these additional measures would be 
necessary if laypeople were adequate stand-ins for musical 
performers, either because they already experience, or could be 
trained to experience, musical compositions in a similar fashion 
to musicians for purposes of the Lay Listener Test. 
Experiments run for purposes of this article suggest that a 
significant divide separates the way laypeople and musicians 
experience a musical performance. The results of the 
experiments indicate that laypeople experience music differently 
than musicians, and that basic musical training does not 
improve laypeople’s performance under the Lay Listener Test. 
                                                          
 95 For example, the major music publisher Warner/Chappell Music describes 
its role and customer base on its website: “[Warner/Chappell’s extensive] catalog makes 
[it] a natural first stop for A&R executives and record producers, feature film and 
television production companies and others looking to record or license some of the world’s 
greatest music.” History, WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, http://www.warnerchappell.com/
about.jsp?currenttab=about_us (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). 
 96 See NAT’L MUSIC PUBLISHERS’ ASSOC., supra note 94 (“Songwriters enter 
into publishing, co-publishing, or administration agreements with music publishers.”); 
see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 673, 697-98 (2003). 
 97 Cf. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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II. MUSICIANS ALONE ARE CAPABLE OF SUCCESSFULLY 
PERFORMING THE LAY LISTENER TEST 
Experiments conducted for this article indicate that lay 
jurors improperly fixate on performance aspects of a recorded 
song in the Lay Listener Test. The results further indicate that 
musicians are capable of hearing and comprehending 
compositional elements of songs in a way that laypeople 
cannot, even after laypeople receive limited musical training. 
Specifically, whereas musicians tended to properly focus on 
similarities in the melody, harmony, and rhythm, a lay 
participant incorrectly opined, “I think as far as music goes, if it 
has a different feel to it, it is a different song.”98 So long as the Lay 
Listener Test is administered to laypeople in musical composition 
infringement cases, society can expect results that impermissibly 
and incoherently “enlarge (or diminish) the scope of statutory 
protection enjoyed by a copyright proprietor.”99 
A. Lay Jurors Improperly Focus on Performance 
Similarities 
The author performed an earlier experiment to 
determine whether jurors are unduly swayed by superficial 
performance similarities when tasked with assessing potential 
infringement of copyrightable compositional elements.100 This 
section will highlight the main findings of that experiment, and 
provide a new analysis of the jurors’ responses conducted for 
purposes of this article. 
In the prior experiment, 178 mock jurors were asked to 
compare the plaintiff’s and defendant’s songs from a Ninth 
Circuit composition copyright infringement case.101 Half of the 
jurors heard identical compositions performed similarly, and 
the other half heard the identical pairs of compositions 
performed differently. The first half of participants heard both 
songs (“Songs 1 and 2”) performed as R&B ballads. The other 
half of participants heard Song 1 performed in a calypso style 
and Song 2 performed as an R&B ballad. For the purposes of 
the experiment, the elements of the song protected by the 
composition copyright were defined as its melody, harmony, 
and rhythm. Variations in each song were constructed to be 
                                                          
 98 See experiment responses, on file with author. 
 99 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 100 Lund, supra note 56, at 138. 
 101 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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“compositionally doctrinally identical,” meaning that, although 
they might differ in performance style, both songs of a given 
pair had identical melodies, harmonies, and rhythms. In total, 
the experiment only altered four performance elements of the 
composition: the tempo, key signature, instrumentation, and 
genre. All other possible performance elements stayed constant 
between versions of the same composition.102 
Although each group heard performances of the same 
composition, participants were significantly more likely to 
believe that the compositions in each pair were similar when 
they were performed similarly (e.g., when both were performed 
as R&B ballads).103 In fact, for the first pair of songs, the 
impression of substantial similarity by one group of 
participants was almost exactly the inverse of the other’s104: 
 
                                                          
 102  For the experiment, 
Tempo, key signature, orchestration, and style/genre were chosen because 
they are all well-accepted elements of performance that can, and do, vary 
significantly from performer to performer, or even from performance to 
performance by the same performer.  
. . . . 
The experiment feature[d] the genre/styles of: (1) slow rhythm and blues, (2) 
calypso, (3) adult contemporary, and (4) upbeat big band jazz.  
Lund, supra note 56, at 146-47. 
 103 The subjects’ perception of similarity was less affected by performance 
when the songs had significant structural similarities, including identical harmonies 
and very similar patterns of pitches and rhythms in the melody. This finding suggests 
that, although the manner of performance affects listener perception of similarity, it is 
not so determinative as to eliminate the awareness of actual structural similarities. See 
generally Lund, supra note 56. 
 104 Statistical analysis was performed for both musical composition pairs in 
order to determine the effect, if any, of performance on each of the perception variables 
(ordinal similarity, ordinal copying, and dichotomous copying). The full results can be 
found in author’s previous paper. See Lund, supra note 56, at 161-73. 
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In other words, the mock jury seemed primarily swayed by 
similarities in performance and not by similarities in the 
copyrightable elements of a composition. If representative of the 
real world, the results of the survey indicate a problem: jurors are 
considering aspects of the works that are not copyrightable.105 In 
doing so, they are impermissibly altering the statutory scope of 
the composition copyright.106 
This is not surprising, as the performance of sound 
recordings by its very nature subjects a jury in a musical 
composition case to irrelevant performance elements. If a 
musical composition is essentially information recorded on 
sheet music or the “generic sound that would necessarily result 
from any performance of the piece,”107 then only fluent musicians 
would be able to make a finding of substantial similarity based 
upon reading—but not playing—and comparing sheet music. 
Non-musicians would need to hear the music to perceive it. In 
order for music to be heard, it must be played in time and must 
therefore have a tempo. The performance, further, must have 
some sort of tone quality or timbre; it must be performed through 
                                                          
 105 Although these aspects could be part of the recording copyright, the 
Copyright Act of 1971 protects only the exact recording itself—others are free to copy 
any performance aspects of the sound recording as long as they make a separate 
recording (i.e., they do not “sample” or duplicate the original sound recording itself). 17 
U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012). (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or 
duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation 
of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted 
sound recording.”). 
 106 Michael Ferdinand Sitzer, Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The 
Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 385 (1981). 
Thus, because every copyright infringement claim is contingent upon a 
finding of substantial similarity, resolution of this issue defines the very 
extent of copyright protection. The relationship between copyright and 
substantial similarity is analogous to the relationship existing between 
ownership of land and trespass: in both instances the acts that are deemed to 
constitute infringement, viz. trespass or substantially similar copying, define 
the extent of the rights, viz. ownership and copyright, respectively. . . . In the 
copyright context, if substantial similarity may be found to exist when only a 
few faint similarities between two works are found, the copyright is of great 
value. If, on the other hand, virtual identity between the works is required, 
plaintiff ’ s copyright is of a more limited nature. It follows that the manner in 
which courts test for substantial similarity, i.e., by using the reactions of 
average lay observers or those of a particular audience, is so crucial to 
defining the extent of copyright protection that the choice of test should 
reflect a policy consistent with the overall goals of copyright law. 
Id. at 389. 
 107 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff ’d, 
349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), amended on denial of reh’g, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), 
aff ’d, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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a particular instrument or voice. In order for the relationship 
between the melody and harmony to be maintained, the 
performance of a musical composition must rely upon a key 
signature or at least a starting pitch. None of these three 
categories—tempo, timbre, and key signature—however, are 
included within a musical composition copyright.108 Jurors should 
not be swayed by irrelevant similarities in performance. But, as 
the experiment demonstrated, they are. 
If jurors are not listening to, or unable to identify, 
compositional similarities in melody, harmony, and rhythm, 
then what, exactly, are they listening to? For the purposes of 
this article, further analysis was conducted on the mock jurors’ 
responses to open-ended questions asking them to explain their 
reactions to the songs. Questions included: “In thinking about 
your responses to Questions #1109 and #2,110 what was it about 
the songs you heard that led you to rate them as you did? In 
other words, what about the songs led you to conclude they 
were or were not similar to each other?” Specifically, comments 
mentioning similarities or differences in performance were 
twice as prevalent as comments mentioning compositional 
elements, further suggesting that the mock jurors incorrectly 
focused upon superficial performance similarities.111 
The answers provided by the mock jurors were coded 
and categorized. For instance, if a mock juror had responded, 
“As they began playing, the melodies where the same. The sounds 
where also the same,” this response was coded for both “melody” 
and “instruments.” “Melody” was categorized as a compositional 
element, along with “beat”,112 “rhythm,” “song structure,” 
“harmony,” and “miscellaneous composition.” “Tempo,” 
“instruments,” “feel,” “key” “style,” “miscellaneous performance” 
and “miscellaneous indeterminate” were all classified as 
performance elements. The results are reflected in the bar chart 
                                                          
 108 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, § 2.05[D], 2-58 (“It has been said 
that a musical work consists of rhythm, harmony and melody—and that the requisite 
creativity must inhere in one of these three.”) 
 109 Question 1 asked how similar the jurors thought the songs were on an 
ordinal scale from 1 to 5. See experiment questions, on file with  author. 
 110 Question 2 asked participants, on a scale of 1 to 5, how likely they thought 
it was that the songs were so similar that one song had been copied from another. See 
experiment questions, on file with author. 
 111 See experiment responses, on file with author. 
 112 “Beat” was a popular term used in responses, but it was not always clear 
whether respondents were referring to compositional elements or performance elements of 
the songs. For instance, one comment that was coded for “beat” was “The background music 
to the beat was very different for both songs, and was what was heard the most, so they 
didn’t sound so similar.” See experiment responses, on file with author. 
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below, with performance elements in dark gray and compositional 
elements in light gray: 
 
 
 
When organized by compositional and performance 
elements, the mock jurors’ answers reveal that their focus 
centered on superficial, irrelevant performance similarities and 
not on the elements of the song that composition copyright would 
protect—similarities that should be ignored when applying the 
Lay Listener Test to a case of musical copyright infringement. 
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Other aspects of the participants’ responses indicated 
that they did not feel comfortable performing the Lay Listener 
Test. Many participants noted that they were unfamiliar with 
the genre of music being played. A few mock jurors went so far 
as to suggest that their lack of familiarity made it difficult to 
discern similarities or differences between the songs. One 
participant noted, “[It’s] hard to construct a survey about these 
music clips in my opinion. I feel like a guitar/drum combo 
would be more easily identifiable in terms of similarity 
perhaps?”113 Another observed, “The music was alright, but 
made it hard to tell what genres because the songs didn’t sound 
popular.”114 Many participants complained about the tone quality. 
One griped, “The electronic versions of the music made it more 
difficult for me to judge.”115 Another stated, “The ‘instruments’ 
sounded computerized and there was no definition to them.”116 
One participant declined to answer the questions about 
similarity, simply opining, “Not the type of music I prefer.”117 
Mock jurors seemed unsure of how to judge the songs 
that lacked lyrics upon which they could focus: “It was very 
interesting on how taking out the lyrics and just listening to 
the instrumentation can almost sound similar.”118 One 
participant observed, “I thought it was interesting only 
instrumental music was used. Similar music with different 
words would make them seem less similar.”119 Another noted, “I 
think they sounded similar to me because they were both pretty 
boring without lyrics.”120 One juror seemed to go so far as to 
invent possible lyrics to the songs: “Some of the words from the 
songs came to mind and they were the same for both.”121 One self-
identified musician commented, “If there had been lyrics to these 
songs, I think listeners would have memorized the melody faster 
and more easily recognized that it had been copied.”122 
                                                          
 113 See experiment results on file with author. 
 114 Id. Interestingly, perhaps because the sound clips were prepared using 
electronic simulations of instruments such as the flute, cello, etc., many mock jurors 
incorrectly identified the genre of the music clips as “classical.” The genres used in the 
first pair were R&B and calypso. For the second pair, the songs were performed in 
contemporary and jazz big band performance genres. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. This suggests a possible limitation to this experiment. Most popular 
music includes lyrics; the experiment’s sound clips did not. 
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Many participants seemed interested not in particular 
performance elements, but instead focused on the context in 
which the music was played or how it made them feel: “The 
1st . . . songs for both pairs were upbeat and something I would 
listen to put me in a good mood. The second songs of both pairs 
were songs I’d listen to in order to relax or unwind to.”123 
Another participant expressed the same general sentiments 
more colorfully: “I noticed how in the 1st song pairing[,] [S]ong 
1 made me want to dance, drink pineapple juice, and eat fish 
while [S]ong 2 made me want to hit myself in the head to make 
the music stop. I enjoyed taking note of the different ways the 
songs made me feel.”124 
There seemed to be some indication that, when 
confronted with the challenging task of explaining why they 
found the songs similar or dissimilar, mock jurors focused on 
the one thing that they could readily perceive—their 
instinctual feeling about similarity. One commented, “I thought 
it flowed nicely, quick and easy. It was somewhat difficult to write 
down in words why I thought pieces were similar. I just felt that 
that they were.”125 Another wrote, “I noticed that the songs were 
different but I didn’t like them so it was difficult to distinguish 
them.”126 One juror went so far as to say, “I think as far as music 
goes, if it has a different feel to it, it is a different song.”127 
The mock jurors’ sentiments reveal that what may make 
music “pleasing to the ear[ ] ”128 of laypeople are facets of a musical 
recording copyright and not characteristics of a musical 
composition copyright.129 The former, for example, protects a song’s 
                                                          
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See experiment responses, on file with author. 
 128 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 129 See, e.g., Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]e 
are mindful of the limited number of notes and chords available to composers and the 
resulting fact that common themes frequently reappear in various compositions, 
especially in popular music. Thus, striking similarity between pieces of popular music 
must extend beyond themes that could have been derived from a common source or 
themes that are so trite as to be likely to reappear in many compositions.” (citation 
omitted)); see also Pyatt v. Raymond, No. 10-CV-8764, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55754, at 
*19 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2011) (“While both songs (like millions of others) share the 
theme of relationships between men and women, this theme is an idea that is not 
copyrightable. ‘Only the actual expression of those ideas might be protected, and here 
there is no overlap in the expression of the ideas embodied in the two songs.’” 
(quoting Currin v. Arista Records, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 286, 293 (D. Conn. 2010))); 
Pendleton v. Acuff-Rose Publ’ns, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 477, 481-82 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) 
(comparing the lyrics to the two songs and noting that “[t]he existence of similarities 
limited to the general idea or theme will not, as a matter of law, support a claim for 
copyright infringement.”). 
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tempo, genre/style, and instrumentation. The latter, alternatively, 
protects the song’s melody, harmony, and rhythms. The mock 
jurors’ apparent disinterest in the actual composition elements of a 
song strongly suggests that laypeople do not constitute the 
intended audience of a musical composition copyright. 
B. Musicians Perform Better on the Lay Listener Test 
A follow-up experiment compared the results of the Lay 
Listener Test when performed by laypeople130 and music majors 
in their second or fourth semester of traditional music theory 
core classes. These classes include music theory, dictation (ear 
training), sight-singing, and keyboard harmony.131 Each group 
in this experiment heard two pairs of songs. The songs in each 
pair had identical compositions but the songs were performed 
differently. For example, Song 1 was performed as a ballad and 
Song 2, its pair, was performed in a calypso style.132 The 
participants were then asked to rate the similarity of the two 
songs on an ordinal scale (“1 = Not at all similar,” to “5 = Very 
similar”). The participants were instructed to compare 
similarities in melody, harmony, and rhythm and to disregard 
any similarities in instrumentation, tempo/speed, style, genre, or 
key signature.133 The participants received the following 
definitions: “For purposes of this examination, a song consists of 
melody, harmony, and rhythm. Melody is defined as a single line 
                                                          
 130 The 108 laypeople used in this exercise consisted of students from the 
author’s civil procedure classes. Although some of these students are musically trained, 
some randomly selected jurors would also be musically trained in approximately the 
same proportions, thus their description as “laypeople” rather than “non-musicians.” 
 131 The 33 to 36 musically inclined participants came from a music theory 
class and a sight singing class. The 138 to 140 laypeople came from civil procedure 
classes and a copyright class. 
 132 The songs were identical except for their tempo, instrumentation, key, and 
genre/style. Recordings of each song pair were generated specifically for the purposes of 
this research by the musical composition software Sibelius. The sound clips were 
created to be doctrinally identical; that is, each version of a song had the exact same 
melody, rhythm, and harmony. Sound clips can be found at http://www.jlundlaw.com/p/
music-copyright-project.html. 
 133 Specifically, the prompt instructed: “Please circle the number that best 
expresses how similar you feel the two pieces are to one another, taking into 
consideration only melody, harmony, and rhythm. Do not consider any performance 
similarities such as instrumentation, tempo/speed, style, genre, or key signature. (1= 
Not at all similar to 5= Very similar).” 
  Participants were also asked to assess the likelihood that parts of the 
songs were copied, and whether any perceived similarity was so great that parts of one 
song must have been copied from the other. This was also done with a second set of 
songs. The first two questions (similarity and likelihood of copying) were assessed on a 
scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the correct response. The third question was a yes/no 
question and coded as 1=yes and 0=no. 
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of notes heard in succession as a coherent unit. Harmony is the 
sound created by multiple pitches playing together. Rhythm is the 
ordering of music through time.” Because the song clips were 
designed to have identical melody, harmony, and rhythm, the 
correct response to the similarity analysis was “5.” This same 
test with same instructions was given to the laypeople group. 
As expected, the mean response for musicians was much 
closer to “5” than that of the laypeople:134 
 
 
 
Musicians performed significantly better than laypeople 
in properly assessing the similarity of the song pairs on an 
ordinal scale.135 The musicians’ answers to open-ended 
questions136 indicated that they knew exactly what was going 
on, perhaps even better than their selections on the ordinal 
scale suggested.137 One musician observed, “The melody was 
                                                          
 134 Although the range for the ordinal scale was 1 to 5, this chart and the subsequent 
chart are set at a baseline of 3 to more clearly depict differences among participants. 
 135 A difference in means test was run between musicians and laypeople, 
setting statistical significance at the 0.1% level (p < 0.001) for all questions in both sets 
of songs. Musicians were much more likely than laypeople to identify the level of 
similarity between the songs and the likelihood that parts of one song could have been 
copied. They were also more confident in stating that parts of one song must have been 
copied from the other. 
 136 The question asked, “What about the songs led you to conclude they were 
or were not similar to each other?” 
 137 There seemed to be some confusion about what types of rhythm should be 
considered as part of similarity comparison. Some of the musicians (particularly the 
more educated musicians in their fourth semester music of music theory classes) noted 
that there were different rhythms in the harmony or different drumbeats that, 
although arguably appropriate for the genres, actually made the “rhythm” different 
from song to song. 
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exact, harmony was the same. The only difference was the 
rhythm, style and genre. It’s more likely that #3 is just an up-
tempo arrangement of #4 (or #4 is a ballad arrangement of 
#3).”138 As was observed in the prior experiment, the responses 
of laypersons from this experiment were not nearly as accurate. 
Laypeople often relied on irrelevant performance aspects of the 
songs to distinguish them. As one layperson noted, “The two 
songs made me feel happy, but different ranges of happy. The 
first song was more of a calm happy and the second one had 
more of an energy and bubbly happy.”139 
Overall, the data suggests that musicians can 
understand and experience both the musical composition and 
musical performance of a song in a way that laypeople cannot. 
A second part of the experiment examined whether 
laypeople performed better in the Lay Listener Test after a 
brief ear-training exercise. A group of 32 laypeople conducted a 
similarity analysis without training and then, one month later, 
performed the same analysis after receiving some training.140 The 
training consisted of approximately 10 minutes of ear-training 
exercises, which focused on the compositional similarities and 
performance differences of “cover” versions of popular songs.141 
The ear training did not help: 
 
 
                                                          
 138 See experiment responses, on file with author.  
 139 See experiment responses, on file with author. 
 140 Laypeople were collected from the author’s copyright class. The first part of 
the exercise was given in the first week of the semester and the second part of the 
exercise (post-ear training) was given one month later. 
 141 The ear training focused on listening to cover songs to determine 
differences and similarities between the different performances of the songs. 
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As the chart reflects, the group’s performance slipped 
with Songs 1 and 2 and improved slightly for Songs 3 and 4 
after the ear training. Neither change in performance, 
however, is statistically significant.142 In other words, there was 
no meaningful improvement from the brief ear training. 
Interestingly, many individuals felt that they had performed 
better when in fact their performance remained unchanged or 
actually declined. For instance, one participant observed more 
distinctions during the second round of the experiment; 
distinctions that did not exist: “After hearing them again, the 
variances in melodic lines, rhythm, and harmonies have become a 
little more distinguishable.”143 
A similar experiment was run with two classes of music-
appreciation students to see if one semester of musical training 
would help laypeople listen to music in the same way that 
musicians do.144 The hypothesis was that even a semester of 
music training would not be enough to hone their ears and that 
musical performance training is a specialized expertise that 
takes years to master. Although the results were statistically 
inconclusive because the sample size was too small, the results 
were consistent with the hypothesis that a semester of musical 
training is insufficient. The students participated in an 
exercise that compared two pairs of identical compositions at 
the beginning and end of the semester, yet they failed to 
demonstrate any meaningful improvement. Although they 
performed slightly better on the first pair of songs, the group of 
music-appreciation students performed slightly worse on the 
second pair of songs.145 
 
                                                          
 142 Thirty-two subjects from a copyright class participated in a study involving 
an ear-training exercise. The students answered the same questions described above 
before and after the exercise. A paired t-test was run to compare the means of thirty-
two subjects’ responses before and after the ear training. In some cases, participants 
were better able to answer the questions correctly after the ear-training exercise. With 
one exception, statistical significance was not found among any of the differences in 
means. After engaging in the ear training, participants were more able to respond that 
parts of Song 3 or Song 4 must have been copied from each other with a confidence of 95% 
(p < 0.05). The ear-training exercise had little effect on subjects’ ability to identify the 
similarity and likelihood of copying between songs, and the practical significance of using a 
one-time, short ear-training exercise to improve subjects’ performance was negligible. 
 143 See experiment responses, on file with author. 
 144 The control group for this experiment comprised musically-untrained civil 
procedure students that participated in the exercise at the beginning and end of a semester. 
 145 See experiment response, on file with author. 
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Even after a semester of basic music training, the 
music-appreciation students did not perform as well as actual 
musicians.  
 
 
 
These results suggest that trained musicians interact 
with a musical composition in a unique way, one that even a 
semester of musical training cannot instill in laypeople. The 
Lay Listener Test is meant to capture the reactions of the 
intended audience. If the audience for musical compositions is 
trained musicians, lay jurors are a poor substitute. It appears 
that neither brief nor sustained (but still cursory) musical 
training helps the layperson to approximate the way musicians 
experience music. 
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The Lay Listener Test is broken. Lay jurors are equally 
likely to find infringement when different compositions are 
performed similarly as they are to find infringement when 
identical compositions are performed differently. This is a 
problem because the Lay Listener Test defines the scope of a 
copyright by determining what types of copying are 
impermissible. Copying becomes impermissible when the 
defendant has taken what is “pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, 
who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is 
composed.”146 In the case of musical compositions, that audience is 
musicians. The experimental evidence suggests that musicians 
distinguish songs based on melody, harmony, and lyrics, and 
laypeople distinguish a song based on the feeling it evokes. 
Consequently, the Lay Listener Test will yield inaccurate 
results—both false positives and false negatives—when 
administered to lay listeners without a musical background. 
III. STATISTICAL SAMPLING OF THE INTENDED AUDIENCE 
The Lay Listener Test was meant to capture the effect 
of a work on its intended audience. For musical compositions, 
the intended audience is musical performers. Because the 
audience for musical compositions is musical performers, and 
not the general public, the appropriate jury to apply the Lay 
Listener Test and resolve a case of alleged infringement of a 
musical composition copyright would consist entirely of fluent 
musicians. As this is rarely feasible, other means of capturing the 
effect of the work on musicians could include the admission at 
trial of expert testimony or survey evidence that demonstrates 
how musical performers might perceive the music differently from 
the typical lay music listener. 
A. Courts Accept Evidence from the Intended Audience 
In copyright infringement cases where the target 
audience possesses specialized expertise, the Sixth Circuit has 
adopted a rule that allows a jury to consider evidence of 
substantial similarity from the specialist’s perspective.147 In 
Kohus v. Mariol, the infringing work at issue was a “drawing[ ]  
                                                          
 146 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 147 Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit made 
clear that “departure from the lay characterization is warranted only where the 
intended audience possesses ‘specialized expertise.’” Id. at 857 (quoting Dawson v. 
Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
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of a latch that [locked] the upper rails” of a playhouse.148 The 
court ruled that in cases for copyright infringement in which 
“the audience for the work possesses specialized expertise that is 
relevant to the purchasing decision and lacking in the lay 
observer, the trier of fact should make the substantial similarity 
determination from the perspective of the intended audience.”149 
The court suggested that expert testimony “will likely be 
required” to educate the jury about “those elements for which the 
specialist will look,”150 including “standard industry practices for 
constructing latches, or safety standards established by 
organizations like the American Society for Testing Materials 
and the Juvenile Products Manufacturer’s Association.”151 
In Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, the 
Third Circuit ruled that the “ordinary observer” test for 
substantial similarity was insufficient for a complex computer 
program.152 There, the defendant, Jaslow, hired Strohl Co. to 
develop a computer program called “Dentalab” to enhance the 
efficiency of its dental prosthetic business.153 Whelan, then an 
employee of Strohl, wrote the program, but she eventually left 
Strohl to start her own business.154 Strohl and Jaslow assigned 
their respective interests in “Dentalab” to Whelan.155 Later that 
year, Jaslow began working on his own version of the program, 
“Dentcom.”156 Jaslow marketed his product as “a new version of 
the Dentalab computer system.”157 Whelan sued for copyright 
infringement. The Third Circuit did not use the typical Lay 
Observer Test to determine substantial similarity. Instead, it 
adopted a “single substantial similarity inquiry in which both 
lay and expert testimony would be admissible.”158 The court 
reasoned that the general public is unfamiliar with this type of 
computer program and that the judgment for such a complex 
case should be decided by a trier of fact who is familiar with 
the type of technology at issue.159 
                                                          
 148 Id. at 851. 
 149 Id. at 857. 
 150 Id. (citing Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
 151 Id. at 856. 
 152 Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 153 Id. at 1225-27. 
 154 Id. at 1226. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 1227. 
 158 Id. at 1233. 
 159 Id. 
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Likewise, in Computer Associates v. Altai,160 another 
case of alleged copyright infringement of a computer program, 
the Second Circuit held that the trier of fact need not be 
limited by its own lay perspective.161 “[W]e leave it to the 
discretion of the district court to decide to what extent, if any, 
expert opinion, regarding the highly technical nature of 
computer programs, is warranted in a given case.”162 
Both computer code and musical compositions are in 
some way “blueprints” for future expression. Neither a 
computer code nor a musical composition is immediately 
accessible or marketed to the layperson. This similarity would 
suggest that the layperson is not the intended audience for a 
computer program or a musical composition. The best way to 
determine the value of computer code and musical compositions, 
then, would be to ask the programmers and musicians directly. 
Perhaps the broadest statement advocating for a focus 
on the intended audience came from the Fourth Circuit in 
Lyons Partnership v. Morris Costumes.163 The court held that 
the substantial similarity analysis should focus on the 
reactions of the intended audience because one of the core 
purposes of copyright law is to “protect the creators’ economic 
market . . . .”164 Lyons dealt with the copyright to the popular 
children’s television character Barney.165 Morris Costumes 
produced a costume of a similar-looking purple dinosaur named 
“Duffy the Dragon.”166 Adults began renting, buying, and using 
the costume at children events.167 Lyons, as owner of the Barney 
copyright, sued for copyright infringement.168 
The district court held that the Duffy costume did not 
infringe Lyons’s copyright because it was not intrinsically 
similar to the Barney character. In reaching this conclusion, 
the court viewed the question of substantial similarity from the 
“perspective of the average adult renter or purchaser of these 
costumes.”169 Lyons appealed, arguing that the district court 
misapplied the legal standard for copyright infringement. The 
                                                          
 160 Computer Assocs. Int’l, v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 161 Id. at 713. 
 162 Id. at 713. 
 163 Lyons P’ship L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 789 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 164 Id. at 802. 
 165 Lyons did not license the rights to Barney because of its “inability to police” 
those rights and because of the risk that individuals might use the images in a “decidedly 
un-Barney-like manner and tarnish . . . his wholesome reputation.” Id. at 795. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 801 (quotation marks omitted). 
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed, finding that the 
standard applied by the district court was too narrow because it 
prevented the district court from hearing evidence concerning 
confusion among children.170 
Although adults were making the actual purchases, the 
intended audience of Duffy’s costume also included children.171 
The Fourth Circuit asserted that the relevant issue in 
determining substantial similarity is “whether the works are so 
similar that the introduction of the alleged copy into the market 
will have an adverse effect on the demand for the protected 
work.”172 Because children accepted the Barney knock-offs as 
Barney, the court held that “[e]ven if adults can easily 
distinguish between Barney and Duffy, a child’s belief that they 
are one and the same could deprive Barney’s owners of profits in 
a manner that the Copyright Act deems impermissible.”173 
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court 
should have heard the “substantial evidence” of actual 
confusion among children,174 which included first-hand 
accounts from children along with “over 30 newspaper 
clippings from around the country” in which the Duffy costume 
was incorrectly referred to as “Barney.”175 
Other courts have placed a similar focus on the effect an 
alleged infringing work has on the market for a plaintiff’s 
goods.176 Many of these cases rely on Judge Learned Hand’s 
classic statement that the finding of substantial similarity is 
based on whether “the ordinary observer, unless he set out to 
detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them and 
regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.”177 At least one 
commentator has suggested that the test as laid out in Arnstein 
v. Porter focuses on whether the defendant’s work acts as a 
market substitute for the plaintiff ’s: 
[B]y assuming the level of dissection in which a lay listener 
engages . . . the trier of fact supposedly gains an impression as to 
whether the defendant has materially and substantially copied the 
plaintiff ’s work so that the plaintiff ’s audience would buy the 
                                                          
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 802. 
 173 Id. at 803. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 802. 
 176 See, e.g., Mulberry Thai Silks v. K & K Neckwear, 897 F. Supp. 789, 791 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 177 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
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defendant’s work over that of the plaintiff ’s. If this has occurred, the 
defendant has improperly appropriated the plaintiff ’s work.178 
Similarly, in Mulberry Thai Silks v. K & K Neckwear,179 
a court in the Southern District of New York found 
infringement because the average purchaser of ties could have 
easily confused the defendant’s necktie with the plaintiff ’s.180 
The defendant, K&K, a competitor of Mulberry Thai Silks, sought 
to create a product as similar as possible to Mulberry’s “without 
crossing over into the realm of illegal copying.”181 Mulberry sued 
for copyright infringement. The court found that the ties were 
substantially similar, noting that 
[a] tie buyer who had seen one of Mulberry’s Ziggurat collection ties 
and wished subsequently to buy the same tie would be likely, upon 
seeing K & K’s copy, to buy it in the mistaken belief that the buyer 
was purchasing the same tie that the buyer had seen previously—
and vice versa.182 
This case shows that in order to “protect the creators’ 
economic market,” which is a primary purpose of copyright law, 
the trier of fact needs to represent the market for which the 
copyrighted work is intended. In the Mulberry case, the market 
to be protected was tie purchasers. For musical compositions, 
the market to be protected is the sale and licensing of musical 
compositions to musical performers. 
B. Statistical Sampling is the Best Evidence of Intended 
Audience 
Although expert testimony may be the most common 
solution when the intended audience of a copyrighted work has 
specialized expertise, statistically reliable consumer surveys 
that target the intended audience may offer litigants and 
courts a stronger evidential source to assess substantial 
similarity. In the context of musical compositions, such a 
survey would ask fluent musicians whether two musical 
compositions are substantially similar to each other. 
                                                          
 178 Michelle V. Francis, Comment, Musical Copyright Infringement: The 
Replacement of Arnstein v. Porter—A More Comprehensive Use of Expert Testimony 
and the Implementation of an “Actual Audience” Test, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 493, 508 (1990). 
 179 897 F. Supp. at 791. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
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Courts are already accustomed to dealing with survey 
evidence in trademark disputes.183 Statistical surveys are the 
primary evidentiary method to prove trademark 
infringement.184 Trademark infringement requires a likelihood 
of consumer confusion.185 Trademark litigants routinely submit 
the results of professionally designed consumer surveys 
targeted at the relevant market as evidence of consumer 
confusion.186 One court noted the requirements of proper 
surveys as follows: 
The proponent of a consumer survey has the burden of establishing 
that it was conducted in accordance with accepted principles of 
survey research, i.e., that (1) a proper universe was examined; (2) as 
representative sample was drawn from that universe; (3) the mode of 
questioning the interviewees was correct; (4) the persons conducting 
the survey were recognized experts; (5) the data gathered was 
accurately reported; and (6) the sample design, the questionnaire 
and the interviewing were in accordance with generally accepted 
standards of procedure and statistics in the field of such surveys.187 
The use of survey evidence is also appropriate to resolve 
cases of alleged infringement of design patents. Infringement of 
a design patent is found “if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, 
giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs 
are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to 
deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one 
supposing it to be the other . . . .”188 At least one commentator 
has opined that the “‘ordinary observer’ test” as applied in 
music copyright infringement cases is “capable of submission to 
a group of survey interviewees.”189 
The concept of using survey evidence for the purpose of 
proving substantial similarity in copyright litigation is not 
new.190 But “[w]hile there is no per se rule barring survey 
                                                          
 183 Upadhye, supra note 23, at 555-56. (“[S]trong consumer survey results can 
counter a defendant’s argument that the plaintiff failed to prove actual confusion.”). 
 184 Id. at 551 (“Because the crux of any trademark infringement case is the 
infringing mark’s effect on the typical consumer, a survey is normally required to 
measure that effect.”). 
 185 Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Lego Sys., Inc., No. 84-CV-3201 (GEB), 1987 WL 44363, 
at *27 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 1987), aff ’d, 853 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 186 Larry C. Jones, Developing and Using Survey Evidence in Trademark 
Litigation, 19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 473 (1989) (“When likelihood of confusion is at 
issue, as it usually is in trademark litigation, evidence of actual confusion may not be 
sufficient to carry the burden of proof in the absence of a survey.”). 
 187 Tyco, 1987 WL 44363, at *9. 
 188 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871). 
 189 Jones, supra note 186, at 476. 
 190 At least one student note has advocated for its use. See Sitzer, supra note 
106, at 423 (“Marketing research, which attempts to measure the market’s reactions to 
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evidence in copyright infringement actions, their admissibility 
has been rejected.”191 Courts typically reject the admission of 
survey evidence because of perceived flaws in the surveys.192 
Two courts, further, have questioned in dicta whether the 
substantial similarity analysis is too nuanced a legal standard 
to be successfully surveyed.193 This belief, however, overlooks 
that the Lay Listener Test is itself a mini survey; although one 
that comes without the usual guarantees of statistical 
reliability that an actual survey would have. 
Perhaps the most significant judicial opinion to express 
a disinclination to use consumer surveys to prove substantial 
similarity came from the Second Circuit in Warner Brothers v. 
ABC.194 In that case, Warner Brothers, the owners of DC 
Comics, claimed that an ABC television show, The Greatest 
American Hero, infringed upon DC Comic’s trademarks and 
copyrights relating to its Superman property.195 The television 
show had adopted many of the quintessential features of 
Superman, such as tearing away a button-down shirt to reveal an 
emblem-bearing costume.196 Warner Brothers stated “that of the 
45% of those interviewed who said Hinkley [ABC’s protagonist] 
reminded them of some other character, 74% (33% of the entire 
sample) said they were reminded of Superman.”197 The district 
court ruled that the survey was inadmissible based on various 
defects and it granted summary judgment in favor of ABC.198 
Judge Newman, writing for the majority, agreed that 
the survey responses were “too general” to be probative.199 The 
court went on to express its doubts that survey evidence could 
ever be appropriate in a copyright infringement case because 
“substantial similarity” is not easily understood by the general 
populace200 and that judges are best suited to strike the 
                                                                                                                                  
various products and marketing schemes, could be especially useful in predicting and 
interpreting audience reactions in copyright infringement actions.”). 
 191 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:83 (2013). 
 192 Id. 
 193 See id. 
 194 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 195 Danny Spiegel, Greatest American Hero Worship on July 4th, 
TVGUIDE.COM (July 2, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.tvguide.com/News/Greatest-
American-Hero-1020127.aspx. 
 196 See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff ’d, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 197 Warner Bros., 720 F.2d 231 at 244. 
 198 Id. at 232. 
 199 Id. at 244. 
 200 Id. at 245 (“The ‘substantial similarity’ that supports an inference of 
copying sufficient to establish infringement of a copyright is not a concept familiar to 
the public at large.”). 
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“delicate balance between the protection to which authors are 
entitled under an act of Congress and the freedom that exists 
for all others to create their works outside the area protected 
against infringement.”201 Judge Newman did not elaborate. For 
example, the Second Circuit did not discuss whether it believed 
juries would be better (or more careful) at determining 
substantial similarity than survey participants, whether judges 
would design less prejudicial questions to ask the jury than 
survey professionals, or whether judges were particularly well-
suited for giving instructions and ensuring that participants 
complied with those instructions. Despite expressing doubts 
regarding the admissibility of survey evidence to prove 
substantial similarity, the court admitted that it “need not” 
decide this issue definitively.202 
Interestingly, Judge Newman argued in favor of survey 
evidence in a copyright case four years later. In Carol Barnhart 
Inc. v. Economy Cover Corporation, the Second Circuit resolved 
a copyright dispute concerning whether mannequin torsos are 
suitable for copyright protection. In a dissenting opinion, Judge 
Newman argued that the difficult distinction of whether the 
object was a work of art or design should not be left to the 
arbitrary values or biases of courts or juries.203 Instead, Judge 
Newman stated, “[E]xpert opinion and survey evidence ought 
generally to be received.”204 It remains unclear, though, 
whether Judge Newman actually changed his mind about the 
use of survey evidence in copyright cases in the four years 
between writing the majority opinion in Warner Brothers and 
his dissent in Carol Barnhart.205 Judge Newman’s solution to 
handling the nuance of substantial similarity was to restrict it 
to a courtroom, while his remedy for making the subjective 
determination of whether a work is art or design was to enlist 
the help of experts and survey evidence.206 He neither explains 
nor notes his apparent inconsistency. 
Although no case concerning copyright infringement has 
definitively excluded survey evidence from ever being 
                                                          
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. (“We need not and do not decide whether survey evidence of the sort 
tendered in this case would be admissible to aid a jury in resolving a claim of 
substantial similarity that lies within the range of reasonable factual dispute.”). 
 203 Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 423 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 204 Id. 
 205 The majority opinion criticized Judge Newman’s test as being “so ethereal 
as to amount to a ‘non-test’ that would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
administer or apply.” Id. at 419 n.5. 
 206 Id. at 422-23. 
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submitted to assist in the jury’s finding of substantial similarity, 
courts frequently have excluded surveys for being insufficiently 
reliable or probative. Arguably, however, the rules for survey 
evidence in trademark infringement disputes could easily be 
adapted to assist an analysis of substantial similarity in copyright 
cases.207 Trademark surveys carefully target the relevant 
audience of potential consumers; responses are solicited only 
from those people whose opinions matter in the purchasing 
decisions of the trademarked works.208 Adhering to this 
principle would be especially important in the copyright 
infringement domain where, like with musical compositions, 
the intended audience has a specialized expertise. Furthermore, 
and perhaps most importantly, these survey standards would 
produce results that are more accurate and reliable than the 
impressions of individual judges or lay juries. 
To illustrate the representative inaccuracy among a 
jury, imagine a case involving the alleged infringement of 
Britney Spears’s song, “ . . . Baby One More Time,” a 1999 hit 
that sold over 10 million records.209 Assuming that a group of 
10 million is the intended audience for the song,210 a survey 
seeking to capture the reactions of that population would 
require a sample size of 1,537 Britney Spears consumers.211 If 
the Lay Listener Test uses only a 12-person jury, the jury’s 
response will likely misrepresent the larger population.212 
                                                          
 207 See supra Part III.B; Keyes, supra note 24, at 442. 
 208 Jones, supra note 186, at 479. In addition to the trademark owner’s current 
and potential consumers, a survey’s “universe” will include “past purchasers, intended 
purchasers,” and persons in a position to “influence purchasing decisions.” Id. 
 209 Nielsen Announces Adele’s “21″ as Exceeding 10 Million in U.S. Sales, 
SCOOP MARKETING (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.scoopmarketing.com/2012/11/nielsen-
announces-adeles-21-as-exceeding-10-million-in-u-s-sales/. 
 210 Although the number of Britney Spears consumers is likely to be higher 
than 10 million, the appropriate sample size for a population greater than 10 million 
does not change significantly. Margaret H. Smith, A Sample/Population Size Activity: 
Is it the Sample Size of the Sample as a Fraction of the Population that Matters?, 12 J. 
STAT. EDUC. 2 (2004), available at http://www.amstat.org/publications/jse/v12n2/
smith.html (“it is the absolute size of the sample, not the size of the sample relative to 
the population, that matters for our confidence in an estimate”). 
 211 Results obtained assuming a 95% confidence level and a confidence 
interval of .025 using the National Statistics Service’s online sample size calculator, 
available at http://www.nss.gov.au/nss/home.nsf/pages/Sample+size+calculator. 
 212 The higher the percentage of margin of error, the lower the confidence that 
the results of the sample’s poll will yield true population values. According the law or 
large numbers, the probability of accurately measuring population values is unlikely, 
and the level of precision is lost, in small sample sizes. See ROBERT S. LOCKHART, 
INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS AND DATA ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 164 
(1998). The law of large numbers states that “as the sample size increases, differences 
between the observed proportion and the theoretical probability tend to become smaller 
and smaller.” Id. at 165. 
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To illustrate what this means, there may be significant 
variability213 among the population of 10 million fans that 
purchased the song. Spears’s audience, for example, might 
include middle age bankers who like the song because it has a 
good beat for their gym playlists, teenage girls who want to 
emulate Spears’s defiant style, feminists who (perhaps 
ironically) find the lyrics to be empowering, and many more 
types of listeners. Each of these audience members will 
experience Spears’s music differently, and it is not clear that 
any one of them will adequately represent the typical listener 
of the song. If we randomly select only 12 people from Spears’s 
audience of millions, we may happen to select mostly bankers and 
no teenage girls, or mostly feminists and no bankers. Such a 
skewed sample would yield an inaccurate picture of the listening 
experiences of the population. Worse yet, attorneys during voir 
dire could attempt to intentionally skew the composition of the 
jury in a way that would grossly misrepresent the audience of 
the disputed work. If the jury misrepresents the audience for 
the song, it likely would bias the results of the Lay Listener 
Test. 
Even if all 12 jurors were part of the audience for the 
work, the sample size is still too small to make accurate 
projections about what the typical audience member values. If 
jurors voted yes for substantial similarity, we could not be 
confident that the larger population would agree. Further, it is 
likely that we would not get a comparable result if we 
assembled another jury of 12 and asked them the same 
question. Indeed, there would be a margin of error of 28% 
among a 12-person jury purporting to represent a population of 
10 million people, in this case10 million Britney Spears fans.214 
                                                          
 213 Variability among the target population, and therefore the sample, affects 
the statistical measurement of the outcomes of interest. Variability describes the 
amount of homogeneity or heterogeneity of the population and how much a sample may 
deviate from the average results of the general population. Id. at 130-33, 136-37. 
 214 This figure is calculated at the standard 95% confidence level, a random 
sample of 12 jurors, assuming a 50% chance of answering either yes or no to the 
questions for maximum variability (see below), for a population of 10,000,000. A 
confidence interval calculator can be found at http://www.surveysystem.com/
sscalc.htm. 
  The sample size is calculated using the equation below and is taken from 
WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, SAMPLING TECHNIQUES 75 (2d ed. 1963). 
݊଴ = 	
ܼଶ݌ݍ
݁ଶ  
Where n0 is the sample size, Z is the value of the area found under the normal curve 
(e.g., 1.96 for 95% confidence level), p is the estimated variability in the proportion of 
an attribute found in the population (if variability is unknown, assume p = .5 for 
maximum variability see below), q is 1-p, and e is the confidence interval expressed as 
a decimal (margin of error; e.g., .03 = ±3). 
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Compare this incredible margin of error with a typical Gallup 
poll, where the margin of error typically ranges between two or 
three percent.215 In other words, if 50% of a jury of 12 voted for 
substantial similarity, the true population response in favor of 
substantial similarity could be as low as 22% and as high as 
78%.216 In other words, our sample tells us little about the true 
opinions of the population. To put the margin of error in terms 
of its impact upon a jury’s determination, if the test was 
repeated with another jury, as few as three jurors (6 – 
(12*0.28)) or as many as nine (6 + (12*0.28)) might find 
substantial similarity between the two works.217 Whether your 
client wins or loses would be based in part on how many 
outliers you draw from your jury pool. 
Obviously, the problem of misrepresentation increases 
considerably with a decrease in sample size. Imagine a sample 
size of three. How easy would it be to have a jury of three 
bankers, or three teenage girls, or three feminists? The 
inclusion of a single banker on this three-person jury might 
significantly misrepresent the target population if, for instance, 
the target population from which jurors are drawn includes 
only a handful of bankers. 
Now imagine a sample size of one. How likely is it that a 
single person could properly represent the opinions of a larger 
population? Imagine further that the single person has chosen 
to ignore findings of the larger population, and instead decides 
to rely on his or her own listening of the song. How accurate 
will the finding be then? 
These numbers were not chosen randomly. They 
correspond with the sample size engaged in the Lay Listener 
Test on a motion for summary judgment (a single judge), or on 
                                                                                                                                  
The equation for estimating confidence intervals solves for e. 
݁ = ඨܼ
ଶ݌ݍ
݊଴  
When variability is unknown, the maximum probability must be assumed, although 
practically speaking the variability would depend on the two songs at issue. With the 
unrepresentative sample of the jury and the use of dichotomous yes/no responses for 
juror determinations (giving a 50-50 probability the juror will respond either yes or no), 
the variability would need to be estimated at maximum, and worst, value of 50% for 
most cases of similar description to the Britney Spears example. As stated in the 
sample size equation, the maximum variability is 50% or p = .5. 
 215 See, e.g., Election 2012 Registered Voters Trial Heat: Obama vs. Romney, 
GALLUP POLITICS, http://www.gallup.com/poll/150743/obama-romney.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2013). 
 216 See supra note 214. The standard of error was calculated using a standard 
95% confidence level. 
 217 See supra note 214. 
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appeal from a motion for summary judgment (a panel of three 
appellate judges). Although judges who reject consumer 
surveys in the Lay Observer Test have doubted whether a jury 
should be replaced by a “public opinion poll,”218 they frequently 
rely on their own private assessments of the works in question 
to decide on summary judgment whether two works are 
substantially similar. 
The advantage of deploying well-constructed surveys is 
clear. Surveys properly define and target the relevant 
“universe” or audience of the work. These surveys can adhere 
to rigid methodological standards, standards that bolster the 
argument in favor of admitting such evidence at trial. These 
standards include: clear precise, and non-leading questions 
posed to participants; expert, impartial administration; 
accurate reporting; sound analysis done in accordance with 
settled statistical principles; and ubiquitous objectivity in all 
facets of the survey’s production.219 To establish that these 
standards were met, the survey’s proponent typically proffers 
to the court a comprehensive statement of objectives, the raw 
data collected from the survey presented in a manner that 
represents the entirety of the results, and a thorough 
explanation of how the proponent used its methods to reach its 
conclusions.220 Furthermore, the experts attaching their name 
to any survey would be subject to cross-examination on any of 
these points.221 
The primary difficulty in constructing a consumer 
survey to show copyright infringement is that there is no clear 
understanding of what constitutes substantial similarity. 
Issues include: (1) what question(s) should be asked by the 
survey, and (2) how would a survey’s results sufficiently 
demonstrate whether there is substantial similarity? 
Case law does not provide much clarity on what would 
be the most relevant questions to ask copyright consumers, 
fluent musicians.222 One option would be to give consumers a 
brief jury instruction about substantial similarity and see what 
percentage of the consumers find in favor of substantial 
similarity.223 Another possibility includes asking survey 
                                                          
 218 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Group, Inc., 443 F. 
Supp. 291, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting the “dangerous precedent of allowing trial by 
the court to be replaced by trial by public opinion poll”). 
 219 Upadhye, supra note 23, at 559. 
 220 Jones, supra note 186, at 490. 
 221 See id. at 489. 
 222 See supra Part I.B. 
 223 Id. 
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participants questions aimed at market substitution. For 
example, one question might be whether the juror would 
consider purchasing the defendant’s work instead of the 
plaintiff ’s.224 A third possibility (consistent with the Feist 
interpretation of copyright infringement analysis) would be to 
ask participants if they see any copyrightable expression from 
the plaintiff’s work in the defendant’s work.225 All three of 
these types of questions have the potential to be leading (or 
even misleading). The consumer-survey approach mirrors the 
Lay Listener Test (making it perhaps more palatable to courts) 
and, so long as the population of survey respondents is large 
enough, would produce a statistically accurate depiction of the 
intended audience. 
The second major difficultly is determining how many 
survey results in favor of substantial similarity are needed for 
a court or jury to find that a work has been infringed. In 
trademark law, the parties use consumer surveys to show the 
likelihood of consumer confusion. Although the exact number is 
debated, it has been suggested that a surveyed rate of consumer 
confusion exceeding ten percent is sufficient to show a 
likelihood of consumer confusion and that a trademark may 
have been infringed.226 
Unfortunately, in copyright, there is no established 
quantitative threshold to constitute a finding of substantial 
similarity. Jeanne Fromer and Mark Lemley address the 
problem in their recent article: 
Defining the consumer as the audience requires us to make 
judgments about how many consumers must agree on something, 
and how we are to account for the views of the remainder. A 
plausible measure is whether a majority of the defined audience 
would find infringement. The majority requirement aligns with the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard plaintiffs must meet on 
the issue of infringement. If the audience is a hypothetical consumer, 
the alignment is perfect: the plaintiff must show that it is more 
likely than not that this hypothetical consumer would believe the 
defendant infringed. But even if the consumer invoked as 
infringement audience is a real one, a reasonable translation of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard might be that more people 
in the audience would find infringement than would not.227 
                                                          
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:189 
(4th ed. 2007). 
 227 Fromer & Lemley, supra note 67. 
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Under their proposal, a survey would tend to show 
substantial similarity if its results demonstrated that more 
than 50% of participants found substantial similarity between 
the litigated works. Although the application of a 50% 
threshold would have the benefit of clarity as applied to a 
copyright consumer survey, the threshold is unlikely to 
quantitatively mirror the actual standard of substantial 
similarity currently employed by courts. Abandoning the current 
standard for determining substantial similarity as espoused by 
decades of case law has the potential of enlarging or reducing 
the scope of billions of current copyrights. If the Lay Listener 
Test were abandoned in musical composition infringement cases 
in favor of using survey evidence of the intended audience at 
trial, a definitive threshold for substantial similarity must first 
be established. In other words, we must first quantify the 
current standard of substantial similarity. 
One possible solution would be to recreate the 
substantial similarity analysis for the last 10 years of copyright 
cases in which substantial similarity was actually litigated and 
decided. For each case, a statistically significant sample of 
randomly selected mock jurors would be asked to compare the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s works and determine substantial 
similarity based on a standard jury instruction. The sample 
would be randomly selected as opposed to targeted (i.e. 
laypeople v. musicians) to recreate past results, which were 
reached entirely by randomly selected juries. For some cases 
the sample might reach a different conclusion than the actual 
jury, however as long as a sufficient number of cases are 
recreated, generals patterns should emerge. Once a baseline 
level for substantial similarity level of past cases is established, 
courts and litigants should be able to recreate a comparable 
analysis in all future copyright infringement cases. In other 
words, once the results of the mock jurors provide a similarity 
threshold, courts and juries would have a benchmark against 
which to compare the similarity results produced by well-
constructed surveys. Such a system would have several 
advantages over the current system. First, the comparison of 
survey results to past cases is clear and easy to apply. Second, the 
reliance on statistical and scientific methods promotes greater 
certainty and predictability. Armed with such tools, parties 
would be able to assess the merits of a case before initiating 
costly litigation. Judges, too, will gain a more reliable standard 
to apply when considering a copyright case on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
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Although the use of consumer survey evidence to show 
substantial similarity in a copyright infringement case is not 
without problems, a well-constructed sampling of the intended 
audience would be far superior to the existing alternatives. 
When deciding whether to admit survey evidence, courts should 
consider the questionable accuracy of the alternative—reliance 
upon an insufficient sample size of jurors or, in the case of 
summary judgment, reliance upon the opinion of a single judge. 
As Judge Newman of the Second Circuit has noted: 
Courts have an important responsibility in copyright cases to 
monitor the outer limits within which juries may determine 
reasonably disputed issues of fact. If a case lies beyond those limits, 
the contrary view . . . of a particular jury cannot be permitted to 
enlarge . . . the scope of statutory protection enjoyed by a copyright 
proprietor.228 
The results of the experiments conducted for this 
article, however, suggest that Judge Newman’s concern has 
manifested itself under the current application of the Lay 
Listener Test. Between the option of consumer surveys and 
relying upon a jury that does not represent the intended 
audience for a work, well-designed surveys are the better option. 
As in the trademark context, juries using survey 
evidence in a copyright infringement case would still be 
responsible for making the ultimate determination of 
substantial similarity. Rather than serve as a stand-in for the 
intended audience and pass judgment, a jury would instead 
weigh the credibility of the evidence of substantial similarity as 
provided by the actual intended audience of the work. This 
shift from playing armchair statistician to assessing the 
credibility of evidence helps realign the jury’s function to tasks 
that it is particularly well suited to undertake.229 
CONCLUSION 
Musical performers are the correct audience for the Lay 
Listener Test when musical compositions are under review. 
The easiest way to assess the opinions of fluent musicians 
would be via a properly constructed survey. Such a survey 
                                                          
 228 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 229 See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) 
(“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” (quoting Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986))(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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would be more statistically sound than administering the Lay 
Listener Test to a jury or panel of judges. 
Musical compositions require specialized knowledge to 
understand. Some courts have allowed expert testimony for the 
substantial similarity determination when the works in 
question require the jury to understand idiosyncratic concepts 
or to have the perception skills of a specialized audience. 
Though it seems counter to common sense, experimental 
evidence suggests that laypeople may not be able to hear music 
the way that fluent musicians do, even after receiving ear 
training. Furthermore, even when administered by a jury 
comprising members of the work’s intended audience, the Lay 
Listener Test relies on too small a sample size to properly 
embody the sentiments of the intended audience. To counter 
these problems, a statistically significant sample of intended 
audience members should evaluate the similarity of two works. 
It is common practice among trademark law to employ as 
evidence consumer surveys produced by the intended audience. 
Jurors would retain the ultimate responsibility for making a 
determination of substantial similarity, but they would be 
aided by much more accurate evidence than their own hunches 
and intuitions. 
 
